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ABSTRACT 
In March, 2005, the City of Surrey implemented a non-traditional law 
enforcement response known as the Electrical Fire and Safety Initiative as one 
component in its efforts to address the problem of marihuana grow operations within the 
city. This innovative initiative involved the City of Surrey’s Electrical Fire and Safety 
Investigation (EFSI) team attending to suspected grow operation locations for public 
safety reasons, instead of having the police to deal with them. While police supported the 
initiative, it was amidst concern in and outside police circles that one failing of this 
approach would be that grow operators dealt with by the EFSI team would escape justice 
because violators would not face a criminal justice system consequence. In particular, 
there was concern that because of the perceived lack of a deterrent effect, grow 
operations attended to by the EFSI team would have a greater likelihood of re-
establishment than those attended to by the police. With this in mind, the purpose of this 
particular study was to examine whether re-establishment was greater in the case of grow 
operations attended by the EFSI team. The study involved looking at all incidents of 
marijuana cultivation coming to the attention of the Surrey RCMP over a two year period, 
with special attention to the impact of the initiative prior to and following the 
introduction of the city’s new Controlled Substances Property Bylaw. 
The study found that re-establishment for EFSI cases was three times (12.7 per 
cent) greater than for the Police (4.1 per cent). Furthermore, re-establishment for EFSI 
increased to one in every five cases in which no change in property ownership took place. 
Additionally, EFSI cases re-established faster and on a larger scale despite having less of 
an opportunity to do so. Importantly though, re-establishment proved to be mitigated by 
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the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw as re-establishment dropped to 1% for police 
cases and to zero for EFSI cases. Accordingly, the bylaw appeared to be an important 
complement to the work of the EFSI team.  
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Introduction 
 
Canada has been recognized as being a major producer country of marijuana 
(World Drug Report, 2006). Presently, the marijuana trade in Canada generates $7.5 
billion annually, with British Columbia exporting approximately 2 billion dollars worth 
of marijuana (Easton, 2004; RCMP, 2005). The high profitability, low risk of detection, 
and lenient sentences historically associated with marijuana cultivation in British 
Columbia has made it a highly desirable criminal enterprise (Easton, 2004; Plecas, Malm, 
& Kinney, 2005). For example, from 1997 to 2003, the city of Surrey experienced a 
375% increase in the number of marijuana production incidents and the city had the 
largest percentage of all cultivation files opened in the province (Plecas et al., 2005). The 
production of marijuana has become a significant priority for the police, resulting in an 
increase in enforcement efforts (World Drug Report, 2006). For example, during an 
address to the Canadian Professional Police Association in 2006, Prime Minister Harper 
pledged to toughen sentences for drugs offences, including larger fines for marijuana 
grow operators (Krauss, 2006).  
It is no wonder marijuana enforcement is a priority in general as it is associated to 
a number of harms within society. For instance, persistent and long term marijuana 
consumption has been linked to adverse affects to physical health such as greater 
incidences of respiratory problems, the increased likelihood of developing cancer of the 
head or neck, and impairment of memory and learning skills (National Institute on Drug 
Abuse, 2005). Additionally, in terms of harms related to the production of marijuana, 
namely indoor cultivation, such locations often contain weapons, other drugs, deliberate 
booby traps and moulds. Not to mention that these locations also have a greater 
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likelihood of being the targets of home invasions (Plecas et al., 2005). Since indoor 
marijuana cultivation generally takes place in residences within the community the 
significance of these dangers is magnified for residents in the community and those 
parties responsible for maintaining public safety, such as local enforcement agencies.    
As a result of the prevalence of residential marijuana growing operations and 
associated spin-off crimes, the majority of local police agencies have been steadily losing 
their capacity to respond to the public’s demand for service. This reality has altered the 
landscape of marijuana enforcement. For the first time in British Columbia, there has 
been an observable progression toward the exploration of non-traditional enforcement 
responses to respond to and prevent marijuana growing operations. One such alternative 
response in Surrey was the Electrical Fire and Safety Investigation (EFSI) initiative. 
The development of the EFSI initiative stemmed from the recognition that 
marijuana growing operations posed a significant fire risk and public safety threat. Given 
this, in addition to a police response identified grow operations required the presence of 
fire and electrical safety officials. The EFSI initiative operates under the Safety Standards 
Act1, which permits an inter-agency team to conduct electrical inspections of houses that 
consume higher than normal levels of electricity. This team consists of two police 
officers, one firefighter, and one electrical inspector.  
With the EFSI model in place, when an alleged case of marijuana cultivation 
comes to the attention of police it is handled in one of four ways: (1) Police officers 
respond to select2 grow operations as in the past and where there are sufficient grounds to 
                                                 
1 Safety Standards Act allows for immediate action to be taken to disconnect the electrical supply of 
premises to prevent injury and property damage.  
2 Select grow operations addressed by the police include those associated with organized crime and theft of 
hydro  
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initiate a criminal investigation they proceed using traditional enforcement tactics; (2) 
Police officers forward grow operations to the EFSI team who initiate an investigation on 
those residences determined to have higher than normal hydro consumption; (3) The 
EFSI team returns cases back to the police in those instances where Hydro records 
indicate that the address in question is within the low or normal consumption range, 
therefore, outside the EFSI mandate; or (4) No action is taken by police in the first 
instance.3
To date, the EFSI team has been active in Surrey for two years and has made 
several hundred site visits to residences that consumed higher than normal amounts of 
electricity. All of these site visits were to residences suspected of being marijuana grow 
operations brought to the EFSI’s attention by the police. Since its inception, the EFSI 
program has garnered interest among those enforcement agencies losing their capacity to 
respond to the demands on police service created by marijuana growing operations. 
While there is optimism about the extent to which the EFSI initiative will help 
law enforcement agencies recover their capacity to respond to demands for police 
services, there is also a growing concern expressed by police and others that no criminal 
charges are laid in cases involving EFSI despite the fact that many of these cases are 
founded grow operations. Arguably, offenders are not punished or deterred from setting 
up operations again. With this in mind, the primary aim of the present research was to 
determine whether grow operations to which the EFSI team responded would have any 
greater likelihood of re-establishment. The finding is critical since the concern expressed 
                                                 
3 It is important to recognize that although no action in the first instance may be taken by either the police 
or the EFSI, in all situations, reported complaints of marijuana grow operations are recorded and entered 
into the national Police Information Reporting System (PIRS) for future possible action and reference by 
other units and agencies. 
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about no criminal charges being laid would be minimized somewhat if re-establishment 
was no greater under the EFSI model than under traditional methods of enforcement. 
To answer this critical question, the current study examined all incidents of 
marijuana cultivation that came to the attention of the police in Surrey between 
November 2004 and November 2006. Specifically, the study was designed: (1) to provide 
an update on the nature and extent of marijuana growing operations in Surrey since the 
research of Plecas et al. (2005); (2) to examine the characteristics of marijuana growing 
operations between November 2004 and November of 2006 for the purpose of identifying 
whether any differences existed prior to any enforcement action being taken; and (3) to 
determine whether EFSI responded to grow operations differed from police responded to 
grows in terms of “probable” re-establishment of marijuana growing operations.  
Particular attention was paid to the impact of the Controlled Substance and 
Property Bylaw that was introduced by the City of Surrey on February 13th of 2006. The 
bylaw enabled the City to apply an increased monetary consequence to home owners that 
were found to have marijuana grow operations in their residences. For this reason the 
differences in re-establishment rates were examined for EFSI and police responded to 
cases both before and after the Bylaw was introduced to ensure that the Bylaw was not 
interfering with the results.  
This paper is organized into five chapters. The first chapter is a comprehensive 
review of the traditional enforcement response to marijuana growing operations. This 
discussion includes an examination of issues that have arisen over time as a result of an 
over reliance on the police to meet community requests for service related to incidents of 
marijuana production. An examination of the enforcement response undertaken within 
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City of Surrey is highlighted within the chapter to provide an understanding of how 
enforcement strategies have evolved within the municipality. 
The second chapter introduces the implementation of a non-traditional 
enforcement response in the City of Surrey referred to as EFSI. The chapter consists of 
background information on the EFSI program and how it works along with some of the 
preliminary outcomes of the EFSI initiative within Surrey. The research methodology 
that was applied in this study is discussed in chapter three. The chapter contains a 
description of how police files related to marijuana production within Surrey were 
categorized and examined.  
The fourth and fifth chapters consider the main findings of the study; particularly 
that re-establishment is greater for EFSI cases than RCMP in the absence of the 
Controlled Substance Property Bylaw to provide some measure of deterrence. The 
positive implications resulting from an amendment to the Safety Standards Act in 2006 
(referred to as Bill 25)4 on EFSI activity are discussed followed by an analysis of the 
limitations of the EFSI mandate which restricts activity to only those residences that 
legitimately consume Hydro power greater than 93 kilowatt-hours per day. The 
recommendation and need for further integration of stakeholder resources and increased 
focus on preventative strategies is highlighted in the conclusion. 
 
              
                                                 
4 In April 2006, an amendment to the Safety Standards Act was introduced called Bill 25 which enabled 
any local Government to request the electrical information of residences within its jurisdictions consuming 
an excessive amount of electricity. 
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Chapter One: The Traditional Enforcement Response 
 
When faced with crime problems, stakeholders, such as community members, 
government officials, and even the police, typically respond through law enforcement. 
For instance, the public’s reaction to the death of four RCMP officers conducting a 
marijuana grow operation raid in Mayerthorpe, Alberta, in 2005, was to demand harsher 
penalties and stronger punishments for marijuana cultivators. Canada’s Public Safety 
Minister at the time, Anne McLellan, held a news conference to state that she would 
consider tougher penalties for grow operations in the proposed marijuana 
decriminalization bill (Galashan, 2005). Former RCMP Commissioner, Giuliano 
Zaccardelli, conveyed similar sentiments by calling for a broad crackdown on the 
‘plague’ of marijuana production in Canada (Maich and Gillis, 2005). 
The Mayerthorpe experience highlighted how the traditional enforcement 
response to marijuana growing operations was still entrenched in a penal welfare state 
model, where the solution to the crime problem was to allocate additional resources into 
law enforcement (Rose, 2000; Garland, 1996; Foucault, 1991). Although James Roszko, 
the shooter in the Mayerthorpe incident, was described by many as a “walking time 
bomb”, suffering from mental health problems and substance abuse, the predominant 
view was that the state should respond as the exclusive provider of security, primarily 
through an increase in traditional policing measures (Galashan, 2005). In the face of 
increasing threats resulting from marijuana growing operations, the majority of 
jurisdictions chose to adopt traditional enforcement policies that relied heavily on the 
police to respond to the proliferation of grow operations (Malm and Tita, 2007). 
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Challenges with the Traditional Enforcement Response 
One of the biggest challenges facing law enforcement is cannabis production 
(RCMP, 2002). In the western regions of Canada, such as British Columbia, outdoor 
marijuana crops have been eliminated for the most part (RCMP, 2006). However, indoor 
marijuana cultivation has proliferated making detection more difficult. One way of 
detecting indoor cultivation is by examining electricity usage because high electricity 
consumption is a mandatory component of the cultivation process. A study conducted by 
a British Columbia hydro company indicated that over 17,000 residences consumed 
electricity well above the normal consumption rate. This has lead researchers to conclude 
that the number of growing operations in the province was within this range; a result 
consistent with earlier estimates suggesting that 17,500 grow operations existed in British 
Columbia (RCMP, 2006; Easton, 2004).  
The traditional enforcement response to these grow operations has been based on 
the theoretical framework of deterrence, namely the certainty of detection and the 
severity and swiftness of punishment. However, due to the volume of marijuana grow 
operations in British Columbia, the likelihood of detection or the imposition of serious 
punishment has steadily declined over the years. The two main factors contributing to the 
declining likelihood of detection and punishment remain limited police resources and a 
lack of a substantial criminal justice response to known violators (Plecas et al., 2005). 
Limited Police Resources 
In 1997, the number of reported cases of marijuana cultivation in British 
Columbia was 1,489. This number has grown to 4,514 in 2003; a three-fold increase in 
reported incidents (Plecas et al., 2005). Over the same time period, federal policing units 
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within the RCMP involved in drug interdiction and organized crime experienced vacancy 
rates as high as 25% (Report of the Auditor General, 2005). In situations where a market 
grows at a faster rate than enforcement resources, a phenomenon known as “enforcement 
swamping” can take place (Kleiman, 1993). Enforcement swamping is an example of a 
tipping model where the results “tip” from one extreme to another after some threshold is 
crossed. Essentially, “punishment capacity becomes scarce and the punishment-per-crime 
falls as the rate of offending rises” (Kleiman, 1993, p.20). In the case of federal drug 
enforcement, not only had enforcement become “swamped” by market growth, but the 
problem was compounded further by shrinking resources. This was evidenced by the fact 
that, even though a general decline took place in the total number of suspected cases of 
marijuana cultivation in British Columbia since 2000, the percentage of cases with a full 
investigation by the police dropped to just over half (52 per cent) in 2003 compared to 
nearly three-quarters (71 per cent) in 2000 (Plecas et al., 2003). The immense growth in 
the market, coupled with the simultaneous dwindling of police resources, helped explain 
why fewer and fewer cases were being fully investigated by the police, despite the recent 
decline in the total number of reported incidents. 
 Another important factor contributing to enforcement swamping is the nature of 
present day policing. The ability of police to address marijuana incidents has become 
increasingly hindered by the highly regulated context of policing. Less than a century 
ago, officers of the RCMP had much more discretion in their investigation of drug 
offences. Then, officer liberties ranged from warrantless searches of primary residences 
to engaging in the prosecution of offenders without the assistance or consultation of 
prosecutors (Hewitt, 2004). A recent study involving a thirty year analysis of police 
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service delivery and costing for the RCMP in British Columbia determined that the 
overall complexity associated with enforcement increased significantly, while police 
resources declined relative to the associated crime burden (Malm et al., 2006). An 
examination of the number of procedural steps involved in investigating drug trafficking 
incidents revealed that, over the past thirty years, the number of steps involved in 
investigating a drug trafficking case increased from nine to 65 (Malm et al., 2006). 
Although the procedural steps associated with marijuana production investigations were 
not broken down to this extent across the thirty year time period, a similar argument can 
be made for these investigations; the highly complex nature of marijuana cultivation 
cases, the contemporary requirement for solid grounds for search warrants, and the 
escalating size and sophistication of modern growing operations have all likely 
contributed to making the successful investigation and prosecution of marijuana 
production more difficult, complicated, and expensive (Plecas et al., 2005). 
The ramifications of limited police resources combined with an increase in 
incidents of marijuana growing operations were demonstrated again in 2007, but from a 
different perspective. While examining the displacement effect of geographically targeted 
enforcement strategies, Malm and Tita (2007) concluded that, by late 2000, most 
jurisdictions in British Columbia had chosen one of four traditional enforcement 
responses to deal with marijuana growing operations. The most commonly chosen option 
was to maintain the status quo; enforcement continued in the same manner as before 
although there was an increase in marijuana growing operations. The second option was 
to reduce enforcement action. This stemmed from the belief that the high costs associated 
with investigating and prosecuting growing operations resulted in a relatively low rate of 
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return on investment. The third and fourth options, selected by several jurisdictions, was 
to react much more aggressively by either reinforcing the resources allocated to their drug 
squads or by establishing specialized tactical units, known as ‘green teams’, to focus 
exclusively on reducing marijuana production.  
Of the four policy options, only the establishment of a dedicated green team 
resulted in any notable reduction in the number of grow operations (Malm and Tita, 
2007). However, considering that only 14% of jurisdictions had the means to implement 
this option, displacement rather than any overall provincial reduction generally took place 
(Malm and Tita, 2007). This result supported an earlier finding indicating that 
displacement of marijuana growing operations from urban to rural areas steadily took 
place in British Columbia (Plecas et al., 2005). More specifically, a general decline in the 
number of marijuana growing operations in the lower mainland of British Columbia since 
2000 paralleled an increase in prevalence in rural areas, such as the Thompson and 
Okanagan area and the Kootneys region, where few attempts to prevent the expansion of 
grow operations had historically taken place (Plecas et al., 2005). 
Declining Criminal Justice Response 
The 2006 crime agenda of Canadian Prime Minister Harper rejected Bill C-175; a 
Bill designed to decriminalize marijuana. Instead, the government committed to 
instituting harsher punishments for marijuana grow operators (Conservative Party of 
Canada Federal Election Platform, 2006). Despite current assurances to address the 
problem of marijuana grow operations, uncertainties concerning the legalization of small 
amounts of marijuana for personal use and unresolved issues surrounding supply have 
                                                 
5 The Cannabis Reform Bill C-17 was introduced in 2004 as an amendment to the Contraventions Act and 
the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act in order to modernize the way Canada enforced its cannabis laws. 
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contributed to the alarming rate of cannabis cultivation incidents in Canada (Fischer, Ala-
Leppilampi, Single, & Robins, 2003; Statistics Canada, 2003; Plecas et al., 2005). For the 
first time in Canada, the courts have played an active role in pressing for law reform 
stipulating punishment for all cannabis users (Fischer et al., 2003). In fact, Canadian 
courts have been criticized for their approach toward cannabis enforcement in general. 
These criticisms have derived from within the country and from other countries, 
particularly neighbouring jurisdictions in the United States (Fox, 2003). For example, the 
quantity of marijuana output in British Columbia has been estimated at between 100 to 
1,460 metric tons, while consumption within the province is roughly between 21 and 54 
metric tons (Easton, 2004). Based on this estimate, it is reasonable to conclude that a 
large proportion of the British Columbia crop is being exported either to other 
jurisdictions in Canada or to other countries, such as the United States. According to the 
United States’ National Drug Threat Assessment for 2006, Canada is an increasing source 
of marijuana (National Drug Intelligence Center, 2006). The report acknowledged that 
Asian organized crime groups in Canada have been exercising much control over the 
production and distribution of high potency marijuana. Further, it forecasted that these 
groups would extend their influence beyond Canada’s borders in the near future (National 
Drug Intelligence Center, 2006). 
Sentencing patterns in cases of marijuana possession that do not protect the public 
or deter offenders have also occurred in cases of marijuana production. The number of 
suspects charged in British Columbia for cannabis cultivation has steadily declined from 
a high of 2,116 in 2000 to approximately one third of this amount in 2003 (Plecas et al., 
2005). Further, when charges were laid by Crown, nearly half (44 per cent) received a 
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stay of proceedings. In accordance with Canadian laws, criminals face a maximum 
sentence of seven years in prison for growing marijuana; however, they receive 
sentences, on average, amounting to little more than a few months (Controlled Drugs and 
Substances Act, 1996; Plecas et al., 2005). Incidentally, the province of Alberta has opted 
to take a tougher stance against marijuana cultivators. The high likelihood of detection by 
police and equally high chance of receiving a significant sanction from the courts have 
contributed to keeping cases of marijuana cultivation low in Alberta (Plecas and Diplock, 
2007). 6
The Traditional Enforcement Response Model in Surrey 
 In spite of limited police resources and lenient criminal justice sanctions, Surrey 
was among those jurisdictions in British Columbia that took a more aggressive stance 
towards cannabis cultivation (Malm and Tita, 2007). Demands from the community and 
mounting political pressure to increase enforcement action against marijuana cultivation 
led to the development of a number of tactics. These tactics included mechanisms to 
increase community contact with the police, privatization of the marijuana grow 
operation dismantling function, and the implementation of a specialized marijuana target 
team.  
Increased Community Contact with Police  
 
 A specialized drug tip-line for Surrey residents was established in 2000 to allow 
community members to report suspicious activities. The line enabled callers to provide 
                                                 
6 In 2003 64% of all founded grow operations in British Columbia were treated as no case seizures, while 
only 20% of founded cases were treated this way in Alberta. Furthermore, in cases not classified as no case 
seizure, charges were laid in 98% in Alberta, but only 76% of cases in British Columbia proceeded with 
charges (Plecas and Diplock, 2007). 
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the detachment with drug related information, the bulk of which pertained to marijuana 
cultivation (V. Arsenault, personal communication January 16, 2007). In this regard, 
community members assisted the police by providing information on drug activity in 
their neighbourhoods. When the line was initially created, the calls were reviewed and 
monitored by a sworn RCMP officer. However, in 2004, the position was civilianized and 
a municipal Intelligence Coordinator was hired to oversee the large number of calls 
requiring police attention. In 2004, the number of files created as a result of information 
from the tip-line and Greater Vancouver Crime Stoppers7 was approximately 500 (V. 
Arsenault, personal communication January 16, 2007). 
Specialized Marijuana Enforcement Team 
 
Historically, the mandated activities of the drug unit have included a broad range 
of initiatives directed at the street level trafficking of cocaine and other illicit drugs to 
multi-kilo level investigations involving organized crime targets. However, in 2003, the 
primary initiative of the unit was the illegal production of marijuana. The Surrey RCMP 
Drug Section, the largest drug unit within the province, assigned twenty-one constables 
and two corporals to the enforcement of marijuana cultivation. In 2004, the section 
underwent further re-structuring and established a dedicated Marijuana Enforcement 
Team (MET) or ‘green team’ consisting of seven constables, one corporal, and two 
                                                 
7 Greater Vancouver Crime Stoppers is an independent, non-profit society and registered charity managed 
by a civilian Board of Directors working to help solve crime in partnership with citizens, the media, and 
law enforcement agencies. The office is staffed by police officers and highly trained civilian personnel who 
take tips and provide information to investigators (Greater Vancouver Crime Stoppers, 2007). 
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investigators who focussed on asset forfeiture through the application of the proceeds of 
crime legislation8.  
Privatization of Dismantling Grow Operations 
 
 Shortly after establishing a specialized MET, law enforcement officials within 
Surrey realized that a substantial proportion of police officer time was spent 
disconnecting, removing, and transferring growing operation equipment. Having officers 
engaged in these activities was seen as hindering the number of growing operations that 
could be acted upon. In addition, these duties were considered to be outside the core 
function of policing. At that time, the average amount of police officer time spent 
dismantling equipment at each grow operation was estimated to be between eight to 
twenty-four hours. It was envisioned that the civilianization of the dismantling function 
would increase the internal capacity of the MET. The amount of time saved would allow 
police officers to spend more time strengthening their cases and initiating additional 
search warrants (V. Arsenault, personal communication, January, 16 2007).  
Eventually, in October 2004, after conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the drug 
section put forward a formal proposal calling for the implementation of an on-call civilian 
dismantling team. It was suggested that the team be staffed either by municipal 
employees or contracted out to the private sector. The additional cost of the team would 
be billed back to the property owner as per existing municipal ‘Cost Back’ bylaw 
provisions (City of Surrey Bylaws, 2006).  
                                                 
8 The federal government of Canada enacted Bills C-61 (1989) and C-9 (1991) to deal with money 
laundering offences and to seize properties obtained by criminal conduct (Desroches, 2005). 
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A private company, Security Resource Group Incorporated (SRG), 9 was awarded 
the contract under a probationary provision in December 2004. The SRG team was 
comprised primarily of retired police officers who agreed to operate under the guidance 
and direction of the officer in charge of the MET. The SRG team was provided with very 
explicit instructions to ensure their role at a marijuana cultivation site was limited strictly 
to the dismantling function. After successfully completing a six month probationary 
period utilising the services of the dismantling team in conjunction with the MET, the 
SRG team expanded their service by providing the same function to the entire Surrey 
detachment. At present, the dismantling service offered by SRG has expanded to include 
other RCMP detachments, such as Langley, Coquitlam, Mission, Chilliwack, and 
Richmond (D. Payne, personal communication, February 16, 2007).   
Outcome of the Traditional Enforcement Response Model in Surrey 
 
As indicated above, the Surrey RCMP drug section receive an average of 500 
marijuana growing operation tips or calls for service from community members and 
approximately 100 Theft of Hydro10 reports directly from BC Hydro on an annual basis. 
The eight member MET using traditional law enforcement tactics has historically been 
able to execute approximately 150 search warrants annually, while the detachment has 
addressed approximately the same amount. This suggests that, all other things being held 
equal11, the total annual enforcement capacity of the detachment is approximately 300 
dismantled grow operations per year. Under the traditional enforcement model, half (or 
                                                 
9 SRG Security Resource Group Inc. provides IT Security Services, Protective Security Services, Security 
Consulting, and Private Investigation services across Western Canada and Ontario (Security Resources 
Group, 2007).
10 Reports made directly to the police by BC Hydro that pertain to a location where consumption records 
are below a normal range indicating that a theft of hydro may be occurring. 
11 Such as the number of enforcement resources for both the detachment and the MET as well as the tactical 
objectives of the detachment. 
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300 tips) of all suspected marijuana growing operations would not be investigated each 
year. Using a conservative estimate, the approximate number of actual grow operations 
coming to the attention of the police that do not receive any enforcement action is 
roughly 135 per year.12 In monetary terms, the market value of the marijuana produced 
from these potential grow operations is approximately 16.2 million dollars.13  
The above estimate only takes into account the monetary value of the marijuana; 
not the additional risks associated with not investigating marijuana growing operations, 
such as fire hazards and health risks posed by moulds or toxins (Plecas, 2005). In 
addition, these figures only apply to the estimated number of grow operations that the 
police are aware of, but do not respond to. In other words, there are likely a large number 
of additional marijuana growing operations in Surrey that the police are unaware of. 
Moreover, the analysis utilized high consumption data released by BC Hydro in January 
2007 to estimate the number of marijuana growing operations in Surrey. It is possible that 
some of the cases of high consumption were the result of legitimate power usage due to, 
for example, a hot tub or a swimming pool. Still, a high level of power consumption is 
typically a good indicator of marijuana production given all the high-powered lights and 
other equipment required for hydroponic marijuana cultivation.   
A recent article, citing BC Hydro estimates, indicated that the city of Surrey had 
35 suspicious addresses (consuming unusually high levels of Hydro power) per 10,000 
residents (Claxton, 2007). If the current population within Surrey is estimated at being 
                                                 
12 Plecas et al. (2005) found that, in 2003, 45% of all cases that came to the attention of the police proved to 
be founded. Applying this logic, 45% of the 300 outstanding grow operations is 135.  
13 The calculation was based on the assumption: 33.3 grams per plant x 236 plants per average grow 
operation x 4 crops per year equals 24 kg per year per grow operation. 24 kg multiplied by the 135 
outstanding grow operations equals 3240 kg of marijuana. If the market value of 1 kg of dried marijuana is 
equal to $5,000.00, 3240kg x $5,000.00 is $16,200,000.00  (Plecas et al., 2005; Easton, 2004) 
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410,000, this would suggest approximately 1,43514 suspicious addresses within the 
jurisdiction (City of Surrey, 2007). Preliminary analyses of BC Hydro data for suspicious 
addresses suggested that approximately one-quarter (25%) of high-consumption homes 
were legitimate users; the remaining three-quarters (75%) were deemed suspicious 
(Claxton, 2007). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that approximately 1,07615 of the 
1,435 addresses could be considered legitimately suspicious of being marijuana growing 
operations.  
As stated above, the seven member MET has the capacity to dismantle about 150 
marijuana growing operations per year. In order to meet the demands of addressing 1,076 
growing operations, 50 police officers would be required; a seven fold increase to the 
existing resources allocated to the specialized MET. The likelihood of acquiring this 
number of additional police officers dedicated strictly to marijuana enforcement is highly 
unfeasible given that, in 2005, the Surrey detachment only received funding to hire 40 
new members for the entire detachment (City of Surrey, 2005). 
In the absence of increasing the number of officers, the challenge for City 
officials was determining how to meet demand within existing resources. From a public 
safety point of view, the disparity between the size of the problem and the police 
resources available to address it was deemed unacceptable and requiring immediate 
rectification. This recognition led to the conclusion that additional stakeholder resources 
were necessary to have any meaningful effect on reducing the problem. The decision to 
include other stakeholders in marijuana enforcement resulted in a move away from the 
                                                 
14 (410,000/10,000) x 35 = 1,435 
15 1,435 x 75% = 1,076 
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exclusive reliance on the traditional enforcement model; in effect a non-traditional 
response model within the overall marijuana enforcement strategy. 
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Chapter Two: The Non‐Traditional Enforcement Response 
 
The continued presence of marijuana growing operations and declining clearance 
rates suggest that the penal welfare state has failed to accomplish its stated objectives. 
Effectively, present fiscal restraint has resulted in two major developments within 
policing; the pluralisation of policing and the search by the public police for an 
appropriate role (Bayley and Shearing, 1996). With respect to marijuana enforcement, 
one example of pluralisation is the privatization of the dismantling function. This chapter 
will detail the evolution of the public police to this current role in marijuana enforcement. 
 In responding to greater fiscal restraint, jurisdictions realized that they needed 
alternatives to prevent and respond to marijuana producers. In March 2005, the City of 
Surrey implemented a non-traditional administrative law enforcement response; the EFSI 
initiative. With this approach, reliance on the police, in the traditional sense, was 
alleviated somewhat by including a variety of other stakeholders in the responsibilities of 
enforcement. This approach resulted in an increase in the resources available to respond 
to marijuana growing operations in Surrey.  
What is EFSI? 
If the theoretical framework of problem oriented policing (POP) is used to 
examine the EFSI model, it is clear that EFSI is perfectly aligned with the POP approach. 
The formal definition of POP is placing “a high value on new responses that are 
preventive in nature, that are not dependent on the use of the criminal justice system, and 
that engage other public agencies, the community, and the private sector when their 
involvement has the potential for significantly contributing to the reduction of the 
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problem” (Centre for Problem Oriented Policing, 2007, What is problem oriented 
policing? para. 1). Similarly, the original impetus for the EFSI initiative was prevention. 
The realization that residences with marijuana growing operations were 24 times more 
likely to catch fire than non-growing homes led to the conclusion that improper wiring in 
marijuana growing operations put the residence and the neighbourhood at risk (Plecas et 
al., 2005; Garis, 2005). The approach taken was to prevent residential fires by conducting 
electrical inspections of residences suspected of housing a marijuana growing operation. 
Once reconceptualised as a fire threat to public safety, the presence and continued 
proliferation of marijuana growing operations became, in part, the responsibility of the 
Fire Service. Ultimately, the creation of the EFSI model resulted in bringing together 
three organizations; fire, police, and safety inspectors (under authorization of the B.C. 
Safety Authority). 
Conceptually, the EFSI approach differed from the traditional enforcement 
response in its recognition that arrests and prosecution, in their current state, did not 
always effectively resolve the problem. The criminal justice system’s lenient sentencing 
approach to marijuana producers, combined with the fact that the average case took over 
seven and a half months to process, highlighted that, in some instances of marijuana 
production, the benefit of the police effort did not exceed its costs (Statistics Canada, 
2005). Given this, the EFSI team’s aim was to minimize the threat to public safety by 
dealing with lower level, volume incidents (i.e. those cases that were not related to 
organized crime). The program enabled the jurisdiction to address the unmet demands for 
service from the community, while freeing up police resources to focus on the criminal 
networks behind the marijuana trade (Garis, 2005). 
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How does EFSI Work? 
The EFSI team is a joint taskforce comprised of two police officers, one 
firefighter, and one electrical inspector. The EFSI model operates under the Safety 
Standards Act.16 The Act permits the inspection of electrical systems and equipment 
within houses that consume higher than normal levels of electricity. The determination of 
high consumption is made by BC Hydro where consumption for a residence is 
approximately 93 kilowatt-hours per day or more, averaged over one billing cycle. This 
level is essentially three times the level of normal consumption (Safety Standards Act, 
2004).  
Originally, the team’s scope was limited to the investigation of addresses obtained 
through anonymous informant information provided by the police. Under this process, 
when the public reported a suspected marijuana growing operation, the police were 
responsible for forwarding addresses considered appropriate for an EFSI inspection to the 
EFSI team. The police officers on the EFSI team would then obtain the necessary 
consumption data under the provisions of the Freedom of Information and Protection of 
Privacy Act (FOI) 17 from BC Hydro. 
However, in April 2006, an amendment to the Safety Standards Act was 
introduced in the form of Bill 25, enabling any local Government to request the electrical 
information of residences within its jurisdictions consuming an excessive amount of 
electricity (Safety Standards Act, 2006). Under the Safety Standards Amendment Act, the 
                                                 
16 This Act came into effect on April 1st, 2004. 
17 The purposes of this Act are to make public bodies more accountable to the public and to protect personal 
privacy by: (1) giving the public a right of access to records; (2) giving individuals a right of access to, and 
a right to request correction of, personal information about themselves; (3) specifying limited exceptions to 
the rights of access; (4) preventing the unauthorized collection, use, or disclosure of personal information 
by public bodies; and (5) providing for an independent review of decisions made under this Act (Freedom 
of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1996). 
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City was granted the ability to acquire consumption data on all suspicious addresses using 
excessive levels of electricity without the need for FOI legislation. Rather than 
responding exclusively to reported cases of suspected marijuana growing operations, the 
City could initiate an investigation into addresses of interest to the EFSI team and provide 
these addresses to the police for assessment rather than the other way around. Essentially, 
with this amendment, the scope of the EFSI initiative was broadened. The EFSI team 
continued to receive information from police as per usual; however, it also received 
information related to those houses that consumed higher than normal amounts of 
electricity directly from BC Hydro. 
Regardless of whether the address of the location of interest originated from the 
police or BC Hydro, the police must conduct a preliminary evaluation to determine 
whether the address is suitable for EFSI investigation (refer to Figure 3.1). 
Understandably, the police retained limited control over this process and functioned as an 
organizing force for the team in an effort to ensure that the suspected address was not 
associated with an ongoing police investigation and to identify whether any risk of 
violence existed at the location. In this regard, the duty of addressing complex marijuana 
cultivation investigations was retained by the specialized MET or, in some cases, other 
appropriate police sections, while lower risk cases were provided to the EFSI team for 
further investigation to ensure that all electrical safety related concerns were rectified. 
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Figure 3.1 – EFSI Process Flow Diagram 
RCMP
HIGH RISK
RETAINED BY 
RCMP
EFSI TEAM 
RECEIVE 
COMPLAINT
EXCESS 
CONSUMPTION 
JUSTIFIED
RETURNED TO 
RCMP
REQUEST TO BC HYDRO FOR 
CONSUMPTION RECORDS
Except locations for which hydro 
consumpion data has already been 
received under the provisions of Bill 
25.
HIGH 
CONSUMPTION
RETURNED TO 
RCMP
EFSI TEAM VISIT 
LOCATION
PERMISSION 
TO INSPECT
STANDARDS 
MET
FILE 
CONCLUDED
APPOINTMENT 
MADE
NOTICES POSTED AT ADDRESS 
AND MAILED TO PARTIES
PERMISSION 
TO INSPECT
POWER 
DISCONNECTED
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
YES
YES
YES YES
RCMP SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Crime Stoppers/Informants
Routine Check
Serving a Warrant
Landlord
Other Crime
General Investigation
BC Hydro
Fire
Missing
Neighbour
Traffic Violation/Incident
Other
KEY
START
END
DECISION
PROCESS
DOCUMENT
Information 
Box
 
- 23 - 
  
In terms of its typical practices, upon receipt of the list of addresses from the 
police, the EFSI team conducts an initial site evaluation to assess whether or not 
excessive consumption may be justified. In addition, notes are taken of any indicators of 
a grow operation on the site. If evidence for legitimate high consumption is not 
ascertained, the team makes a request to BC Hydro for the residence’s consumption 
records under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act. Addresses 
found to be at higher than normal levels of electrical consumption, as determined by BC 
Hydro, are returned to the EFSI team for further investigation. Presently, the EFSI team 
can only proceed with those addresses in which consumption records fall within a higher 
than normal category. All other addresses, irrespective of whether physical indicators 
exist that corroborate the presence of a grow operation, are returned to the RCMP with no 
further action taken by the EFSI team. 
Once confirmation is received of high consumption at a location, the EFSI team 
returns to the residence and posts a notice requesting inspection. The posted notice 
indicates that the owner or occupant must phone and make an appointment for an 
inspection to occur within 48 hours or the electrical power will be disconnected. Notices 
are also couriered to the property owner and resident if necessary. If no appointment is 
made within the allocated time, the EFSI team returns to the location and the electrical 
power is disconnected.  
 In the event that an appointment is made within the allotted 48 hours, the EFSI 
team attends at the prearranged time. Upon arrival at the scene, the police officers on the 
team are responsible for securing the premises. The occupants of the residence are asked 
to wait outside while an electrical inspector conducts an inspection of the house for 
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electrical code violations. If an electrical code violation is found, the electrical power is 
disconnected. In the final stages, the file is turned over to the City’s electrical department 
for follow-up to ensure that the appropriate measures are taken to correct the violations 
prior to the re-connection of the power supply. 
 Initially, when EFSI was introduced, the only monetary penalty to owners for any 
electrical violations was the cost of making the required repairs. In terms of cost-recovery 
for the City of Surrey, only the standard permit fee for approval of electrical repairs, 
which amounted to $73, could be recouped. However, on February 13th 2006, the City 
adopted a new bylaw; the Controlled Substance Property Bylaw (City of Surrey, 2006). 18 
Introduction of the new bylaw increased the monetary consequences associated with 
controlled substance properties and improved the cost-recovery component. While the 
previous Bylaw that was enacted in 2001 contained provisions for a maximum penalty of 
$5,000 per day in situations where a marijuana growing operation was located within a 
residence, the new bylaw allowed for a maximum penalty of $10,000 per day on owners. 
Furthermore, under the new provisions, the City was able to recover a larger percentage 
of the costs incurred when dismantling a growing operation. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the 
increasing monies recovered over the years. 
 
 
  
                                                 
18 Controlled Substance Properties that contravene applicable standards under the Building Code, British 
Columbia Fire Code, Safety Standards Act, Health Act, or other applicable enactments, including bylaw 
requirements of the City, create risks to the health and safety of occupiers and neighbours, are offensive 
and a nuisance, and reduce the value of neighbouring properties (Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, 
1996) 
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Figure 3.2 – Total Costs Associated with Dismantling Marijuana Growing 
Operations Invoiced for Cost Recovery 2003-2007 
 
  * Amounts rounded to nearest whole number 
  ** The 2007 amount is an approximation based on the 1st quarter total of $369,865.00 
The above figure indicates that the amount billed to homeowners has steadily increased. 
The increase from 2007 to 2008 is projected to be 97% as a result of the Controlled 
Substance Property Bylaw (H. Dhillon, personal communication February 2, 2007). 
Furthermore, additions to the bylaw included provisions for prospective homeowners or 
renters to find out whether a home previously contained a grow operation or a 
methamphetamine lab. 
The City of Surrey is not the only jurisdiction in the lower mainland to enact such 
a bylaw; the cities of Port Moody, Delta, Abbotsford, and Ladner have similar bylaws in 
place. What is unique in Surrey is the incorporation of Electrical and Fire Safety 
Inspections of properties suspected to be in contravention of the bylaw. Essentially, the 
introduction of the Controlled Substance Property Bylaw is a clear reflection of state 
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attempts to protect the welfare of the population through the improvement of community 
conditions (Foucault, 1991). 
Preliminary Outcomes of the EFSI Initiative 
 As predicted, the implementation of EFSI helped to clear the majority of 
outstanding tips accumulated as a result of police capacity issues. The EFSI teams made 
several hundred residential inspections and identified a large number of electrical 
violations and evidence of growing operations (Garis, 2006). Overall, the program has 
been very well received at both a local and provincial level (Garis, 2006). Since the 
introduction of the EFSI initiative, a number of jurisdictions, such as Langley, Coquitlam, 
Ridge Meadows, and Abbottsford, facing capacity issues, have adopted similar models.19 
Areas outside the lower mainland, such as Victoria and Kelowna, have also adopted the 
program.  
Interest level in the program from jurisdictions outside of British Columbia has 
also been high. For example, Calgary sent representatives to learn more about the process 
even prior to its official implementation in Surrey (Garis, 2005). Although Calgary has 
yet to establish an EFSI team, the Calgary Health Region’s Environmental Health 
Program now includes provisions for residences containing marijuana growing operations 
similar to those initiated in Surrey. A bylaw similar to the Controlled Substance Property 
Bylaw allows residences to be deemed “unfit for human habitation” and posted with a 
                                                 
19 In 2005, Abbotsford established an integrated Public Safety Inspection team to conduct inspections of 
residences suspected of housing a marijuana growing operation. The strategy was based on the authority 
provided by the Community Charter, the Fire Services Act, and the City’s Controlled Substance Property 
Bylaw. The basis for the program derived from a desire to improve public safety through the use of an 
administrative approach, rather than the criminal justice system. This approach is similar to EFSI (City of 
Abbotsford, 2005).  
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Notice of Health Hazard filed with the Land Titles Office to be placed on the property 
title (Calgary Health Region, 2006). The Executive Officer in Calgary has the authority to 
carry out inspections and issue written orders. Under this model, the Executive Officer 
generally attends the property at the time of the police intervention and criminal 
investigation. The property is assessed for structural damage, chemical spills, and molds.  
At the provincial level, Ontario, for example, has opted for a more partnership-
oriented approach by including electrical and fire considerations into their enforcement 
plan. Changes to the Utilities Act in Ontario have been made empowering electrical 
utilities to cut the supply to properties without notice if they suspect that unusual 
consumption patterns are the result of a growing operation (Hilton, 2005). Furthermore, 
the maximum penalties associated with contraventions of the Ontario Fire Code, such as 
tampering with wiring that would cause excessive heating leading to a fire, have been 
doubled (Hilton, 2005). 
Discussion 
 The growing popularity of the EFSI initiative with other non-traditional 
approaches suggests that there are viable alternate enforcement models which allow the 
police to regain some capacity to combat marijuana growing operations. Although the 
jurisdiction of Surrey is the area of examination for this current study, it is apparent that 
an improved understanding of the impact of this alternative response would benefit other 
jurisdictions, especially when considering that, although British Columbia has historically 
been recognized as having a greatest concentration of marijuana growing operations in 
Canada, recent data from the United Nations World Drug Report (2006) indicated that 
this was no longer the case. The report stated “seizure and eradication figures suggest that 
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Ontario and Quebec have recently caught up, and, more recently, major operations have 
been detected in other provinces” (World Drug Report, 2006, p. 159). 
It is reasonable to assume that the combined application of the MET or ‘green 
team’ with the EFSI initiative would provide positive results given that the risk of 
detection has increased substantially for marijuana producers in Surrey. However, 
rational choice theorists would argue that the introduction of an EFSI model is unlikely to 
produce significant results without a commitment to prosecute and punish violators in the 
criminal justice system. As there has been no data collected to date examining the effect 
of this non-traditional model of enforcement, the current research was designed to 
contribute to the body of knowledge on alternative response models to address marijuana 
growing operations.  
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Chapter Three: Methods 
 
The present research utilized the Operational Statistics Reporting (OSR) system 
within the Police Information Retrieval System (PIRS) to identify all marijuana 
production files brought to the attention of the police from November 1st, 2004 to 
November 30th, 2006 in Surrey.20 The total number of incidents falling within the 
specified date range was 1,366 police files. These files were manually reviewed to 
identify only those cases directly related to residential marijuana growing operations. 21 In 
total, 1,087 police files related to residential marihuana grow operations were identified 
and categorized into one of four groups: 
 
(1) RCMP – cases where the police employed traditional enforcement tactics to 
respond to select grow operations coming to their attention;22  
(2) EFSI – cases in which information of suspected grow operations was 
forwarded to the EFSI team by the police and were determined through BC Hydro 
records as having higher than normal hydro consumption levels; 
(3) EFSI return to RCMP – cases returned to the police by EFSI because the 
addresses in question were deemed by BC Hydro as being within the low or 
normal consumption range and, therefore, outside the mandate of EFSI; and 
(4) No action – cases in which no action was taken by police in the first 
instance.23
 
                                                 
20 This refers exclusively to all incidents of crimes reported to or discovered by the police. 
21 Residences were defined as all single-family dwellings, such as a house, a mobile home, a self-contained 
suite in a rooming/boarding house, an apartment, or one unit of a duplex. 
22 Select grow operations responded to the police included those associated with organized crime and theft 
of hydro.  
23 It is important to recognize that although no action in the first instance may be taken by either the police 
or the EFSI, in all situations, reported complaints of marijuana grow operations are recorded and entered 
into the national Police Information Reporting System for future possible action and reference by other 
units and agencies. 
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The distribution of cases within each group, as a percentage of the total number of cases, 
is presented in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1 – Distribution of Cases 
Category Frequency Percentage Total Cases 
RCMP 257 23.6 % 
EFSI 180 16.6 % 
EFSI return to RCMP 365 33.6 % 
No action 285 26.2 % 
Total 1087 100.0 % 
 
A majority of cases (59.8 per cent) were categorized as EFSI return to RCMP or no 
action. Given that the purpose of the present research was to conduct a comparison to 
EFSI only, these cases were not included in further analyses. Still, some comparative 
analysis was undertaken to determine the extent to which these cases were the same as 
those included in the study.  
The main objective of determining whether the EFSI initiative resulted in any 
greater re-establishment of associated grow operations was accomplished by comparing 
EFSI cases to the other ways grow operations were handled. More specifically, the 
likelihood of re-establishment for all cases in question was determined through Hydro 
consumption records for November 2006 provided by Surrey Fire Service. In effect, this 
allowed for a period of between one and twenty-four months for re-establishment to 
occur following any action taken by the Surrey RCMP or EFSI. Accordingly, at one 
level, the analysis involved was simply an exercise of comparing across groups to 
determine which group of cases had the highest percentage of “probable” re-
establishment. Referring to “probable” was appropriate because, while higher than 
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normal (approximately 93KW per day) Hydro consumption levels provided a very good 
indicator of a grow operation, in rare cases, there were other reasons a property might 
produce high readings.24 Further, instances of marijuana production involving an outright 
theft of hydro power were not included within the dataset as these cases of re-
establishment failed to meet the higher than normal Hydro consumption levels; this is a 
recognized limitation of the present study. 
At another level, the analysis was more complex because of the need to examine 
the extent to which re-establishment was influenced by the characteristics of the grow 
operations themselves. Therefore, all 1,087 police files were reviewed using a coding 
sheet (see Appendix A) to assess what differences, if any, existed between the groups in 
question in the first instance and prior to any enforcement action. Additionally, data 
collected by the EFSI team was also coded in association with the initially coded police 
file information (see Part 3 of Appendix A). An additional layer of information relating to 
the characteristics of the properties was obtained by querying Tempest25 and coding the 
information for all addresses (see Part 4 of Appendix A).  
When conducting the final analysis, the No action and EFSI return to RCMP 
cases were excluded leaving only RCMP and EFSI cases as the primary study group of 
interest. As indicated in Table 4.2, the primary study group comprised 437 founded cases 
of marijuana growing operations that either EFSI (n = 180) or the RCMP (n = 257) 
responded to.  
 
                                                 
24 As mentioned above, higher than normal hydro consumption levels may result in residences with a pool, 
hot tub, residential business, etc. 
25 Tempest is a municipal database containing property and ownership data for residences that fall within 
the boundaries of the city of Surrey 
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 Table 4.2 – Founded Cases of Marijuana Production Attended by the RCMP or 
EFSI by Year 
File Year   
  2004 2005 2006 
Total 
  
RCMP Count 12 112 133 257 
  %  70.6% 51.9% 65.2% 58.8% 
EFSI Count 5 104 71 180 
  %  29.4% 48.1% 34.8% 41.2% 
 Count 17 216 204 437 
 
While the file review analysis was essentially a descriptive one, it was believed that this 
analysis would situate the re-establishment findings in context. 
Importantly, although the review of police file data, hydro consumption records, 
and property details involved access to confidential information, after the data entry was 
completed and verified, all personal identifiers were removed from the database and were 
not used in the analysis for the present research. The statistical analysis program SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) was used to analyse the database. 
 As noted in previous studies on marijuana growing operations and related 
research utilising police data, it must be recognized that police data collection is often 
incomplete and rarely standardised across variables (Plecas, Dandurand, Chin, & Segger, 
2002; Plecas et al., 2005). For this reason, it is reasonable to assume that some of the data 
presented in this paper, such as the presence of hazards, other drugs, and the number of 
lights located at the scene, are an underestimation.   
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Chapter Four: Results and Analysis 
 
Incidents of Suspected Marijuana Production 
The number of suspected marijuana growing operations coming to the attention of 
police within the lower mainland has declined (12 percent) between 2004 and 2006 (see 
Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 – Marijuana Production Cases Coming to the Attention of Police Between 
2004 to 2006 by Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction 2004 2005 2006 % Change over 
2 Year Period 
Burnaby 244 197 174 - 29 % 
Coquitlam 287 229 184 - 36 % 
North Vancouver 26 19 20 - 23 % 
Richmond 72 76 78 + 8 % 
Surrey 717 699 752 + 5 % 
Ridge Meadows 234 192 168 - 28 % 
Langley 144 155 110 - 24 % 
Mission 151 165 207 + 37 % 
Delta ** 44 44 45 + 2 % 
Abbotsford ** 90 60 119 + 32 % 
Vancouver 270 220 153 - 43 % 
New Westminster ** 18 17 19 + 6 % 
Port Moody 7 4 5 - 29 % 
Total 2304 2077 2034 - 12 % 
* Information obtained from PIRS and PRIME.  
** The figure for 2004 files was based on the average of actual 2005 and 2006 figures. 
 
When only those jurisdictions in the Fraser Valley (i.e. Surrey, Langley, Mission, Delta 
and Abbotsford) were considered, the region experienced an 8% increase; slightly higher 
than Surrey’s overall increase (5 percent). Moreover, there were several regions with 
substantial decreases over the two year period, such as Vancouver (43 percent), 
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Coquitlam (36 percent), Burnaby (29 percent), Port Moody (29 percent), and Ridge 
Meadows (28 percent). These findings were consistent with the Plecas et al. (2005) report 
which identified a general downward shift in the total number of incidents of marijuana 
production within the lower mainland, especially when compared to more rural areas. 
The basis for this shift was likely the need for growing producers to have larger 
properties to maximize production and an assumption that rural properties were less 
likely to come to the attention of the police because of their degree of isolation (Plecas et 
al., 2005). 
Another factor that potentially contributed to the slight decline in figures is that 
the RCMP has been involved in changing its records management system (RMS) over the 
past three years; a transition that has resulted in some initial inconsistencies in data 
coding. Fortunately, for the purpose of the present research, this did not pose a problem 
as Surrey had not made this transition during the time period under consideration for this 
current study.  
The fact that the majority of other jurisdictions experienced a decline in incidents 
while Surrey experienced an increase in 2006 may also be the result of proactive policing 
efforts and heightened community awareness. These factors can contribute to an increase 
in crime statistics even when there is no ‘real’ increase in the number of incidents 
because of the improved ability to detect marijuana production.  
Given that the only major change that took place with marijuana enforcement in 
Surrey was the implementation of EFSI, and that one of the key objectives of the program 
was to increase public awareness, the statistical increase may be attributed to the increase 
in the actual number of marijuana production files as a result of program implementation. 
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This assumption was further supported by an increase in the overall number of 
community complaints (or tips) received by the police after the EFSI model was 
introduced. As demonstrated in Table 5.2, a 4% increase in the number of files initiated 
from an anonymous source (i.e. Crime Stoppers) took place over the two year period, 
while all other sources of complaint declined.  
 
Table 5.2 – Sources of Information Leading to Opening a Marijuana Cultivation 
File in Surrey by Source and Year 
Source of Complaint File Year 
  2004 2005 2006 
Percentage 
Change over 
2 year period 
 Crime Stoppers or other 
Anonymous Source 
535 433 556 4 % 
  Routine Check 1 1 0 -100 % 
  Landlord 25 14 14 -44 % 
  Other Crime 66 30 58 -12 % 
  General Investigation 13 7 5 -62 % 
  BC Hydro 51 31 47 -8 % 
  Other 65 24 34 -48 % 
  Neighbour 36 14 28 -22 % 
  Traffic Violation/Incident 6 2 3 -50 % 
Total 798 556 745 -7 % 
    *All figures rounded to nearest whole number. 
Comparison of Current and Historical Sample of Marijuana Cultivation 
Files 
The current sample of data from the file reviews (see Table 5.3) was compared 
with the data from the Plecas et al. (2005) study to determine the extent to which changes 
had taken place generally with marijuana growing operations in Surrey since 2003.  
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Table 5.3 – Current and Historical RCMP Founded Cases of Residential Marijuana 
Growing Operations 
Characteristic Current Sample
% 
Historical Sample 
% 
Other Drugs Seized 10 % 9 % 
Firearm Seized 3 % 12 % 
Other Weapon Seized 12 % 5 % 
Equipment Seized 91 % 82 % 
Fire Involved 6 % 7 % 
Guard Dog Present 6 % 11 % 
Presence of Hydro Bypass 56 %  36 % 
Use of Violence at Time of Arrest 0.5 % 1 % 
Type of Seizure   
 Case 51 % 65 % 
 No Case 49 % 35 % 
Charges Laid by Crown 48% 63% 
Suspects Present 41 % 80 % 
Days Elapsed 12 days 14 days 
Number of Plants Seized 488 plants 257 plants 
Number of kg Marijuana Seized 1 kg 5 kg 
Number of Lights 25 lights 9 lights 
Amount of Cash Seized $2298  $2104 
Amount of Hydro Theft $4484 $2996 
Number of Suspects 1.1 suspects 1.4 suspects 
*All figures rounded to nearest whole number with the exception of Number of Suspects and Use 
of Violence at Time of Arrest. 
 
 
The main finding from this comparison was that the size and sophistication of growing 
operations in Surrey had increased over time. The average number of plants within the 
historical sample was 257 compared to an average of 488 plants; a 90% increase in the 
number of plants. This increase was paralleled by a 178% increase in the number of lights 
within growing operations.    
There was also a marked increase in the presence of hydro bypasses and the 
amount of theft of hydro power. The likelihood of locating a hydro bypass within 
growing operations increased by 56%, while the amount of theft of hydro power 
increased by 50%. A proportionally greater increase in theft of hydro power was expected 
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as a natural by-product of the introduction of the EFSI process within Surrey as the team 
was activated by a finding of high levels of power usage. Given that the increase in the 
amount of theft of hydro power was far greater, at 50%, than the historical sample of data 
for Surrey, and that the average increase for the rest of the province from 1998 to 2003 
was approximately 7%, it would appear that this prediction was well supported (Plecas et 
al., 2005).    
 The data also showed a trend toward declining incidents of case seizures and the 
likelihood of locating suspects within residences. The reduction of both of these factors 
provided additional insight into the decline in the number of charges ultimately laid by 
crown. Finally, information related to the presence of children was not included in the 
above analysis as the data was unreliable. However, it is conceivable that the likelihood 
of finding children in these locations also declined since the likelihood of locating 
suspects was lower. 
Comparison of RCMP and EFSI Characteristics  
A descriptive analysis of RCMP and EFSI cases was conducted to assess 
differences between the groups in the first instance and prior to any enforcement action 
(see Table 5.4). 
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Table 5.4 – Comparisons of Characteristics Prior to Enforcement Action by RCMP 
and EFSI Cases 
Characteristic RCMP EFSI 
Sources of Complaint  
(Anonymous Sources of Information) 
22 %* 96 % 
Age of Information 11 days* 81 days 
Lot Size (square feet) 24,460 22,537 
Assessed Land Value $250,253** $260,653 
Assessed Improvements $119,830** $109,900 
Total Property Taxes $2,602** $2,921 
Number of Days Property Owned 1,337 days 1,366 days 
* c2, p<0.05. 
** Figures based on 2005 Property Tax Assessment Information. 
*** All figures rounded to nearest whole number. 
 
 
RCMP and EFSI cases were similar in a number of ways. The average lot size, assessed 
land value, assessed improvements, and total property taxes did not differ significantly. In 
effect, the properties appeared to be essentially the same. The differences were with 
respect to the sources of complaint and the age of the information.  
 While the RCMP received information on suspected marijuana growing 
operations from a variety of sources, the EFSI team received information from only one 
source primarily.26 Although the RCMP responded to a variety of information sources, 
for the most part, the sources of information were evenly distributed between another 
crime (29.2 per cent), BC Hydro (24.5 per cent), and anonymous information (21.8 per 
                                                 
26 As mentioned earlier, in April 2006, EFSI reliance on anonymous informant information was reduced 
when an amendment to the Safety Standards Act was made in the form of Bill 25. Under the provisions of 
Bill 25, the scope of EFSI was broadened as all jurisdictions were given the authority to request 
information pertaining to locations consuming more than 93 Kilowatt-hours per day directly from BC 
Hydro. However, the cases that went directly to the City, as per Bill 25, were not necessarily included in 
the current research as they were not cases reported to the police. These cases would only be included if a 
police file already existed for the address of interest. 
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cent). EFSI, on the other hand, received nearly all of their cases (95.6 per cent) from 
anonymous information, such as Crime Stoppers (see Table 5.5). 
 
 
Table 5.5 – Sources of Complaint: Percentage from each Source from November 1, 
2004 to November 30, 2006 
Action  Source of Complaint 
  No Action RCMP EFSI EFSI return 
to RCMP 
 Crime Stoppers/Informant 92.6 % 21.8 % 95.6 % 97. 0% 
  Landlord 2.1 % 4.3 % 1.1 % .3 % 
  Other crime .0 % 29.2 % .0 % .0 % 
  General Investigation .4 % 1.9 % .0 % .0 % 
  BC Hydro 1.8 % 24.5 % .0 % .5 % 
  Other 1.1 % 12.8 % 1.1 % .0 % 
  Neighbour 2.1 % 3.9 % 2.2 % 2.2 % 
  Traffic Violation/Incident .0 % 1.6 % .0 % .0 % 
 
 
When suspected marijuana growing operations were attended to by either the EFSI 
team or the RCMP, the information EFSI acted upon tended to be more dated than the 
RCMP information. This was due to the time elapsed between the reported dates and 
attended dates being affected by the RCMP responding both to real time crimes and 
historical crime information, not just historical data. Again, the main objective of EFSI 
was to reduce the threat to public safety resulting from improper electrical wiring. Given 
this, the EFSI team tried to clear the considerable amount of backlogged police 
information related to suspected marijuana growing operations. By design, the EFSI team 
worked with older information rather than responding to current reports of marijuana 
production.  
Regardless of what approach was taken to respond to suspected marijuana growing 
operations, it was predicted that, over time, as the backlog of anonymous informant cases 
- 40 - 
  
declined, the response time would diminish for both groups. As indicated in Figure 5.1, 
this occurred. 
 
Figure 5.1 – Number of Days Time Lapse for Anonymous Informant Cases from 
November 1, 2004 to November 30, 2006 
 
 
As the EFSI team cleared the backlog of incidents, it was able to reduce its response time 
nearly in half with each successive year. The most encouraging finding was the impact on 
police response time in the two year period. As demonstrated in Table 5.6, the 
improvement in response time amounted to a 29% (or 12.5 day) reduction in the time 
taken by the police to respond to Crime Stoppers and Informant information regarding 
suspected marijuana growing operations. 
 
Table 5.6 – Police Response Time in Days by Sources of Complaint 
Source of Complaint 2004 
 
2005 2006 Percentage 
Change over  
2 year period 
Crime 
Stoppers/Informant 
43.8 24.3 31.3 -29 % 
*Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number. 
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 In terms of property characteristics, a comparison between EFSI and police cases 
revealed no significant differences. The most revealing finding related to property 
characteristics was lot size. A Corporate Report submitted to the Mayor and Council of 
the City of Surrey on July 7th 2006 noted an emerging trend in the housing market in 
Surrey toward smaller, single family lots (City of Surrey, 2006). While the average lot 
size in Surrey in 1993 was approximately 7,600 square feet, in 2005, the average lot size 
was 4,500 square feet or a 42% reduction in lot size in the past 12 years among average 
residences in Surrey (City of Surrey, 2006). Yet, despite this general decline, the average 
lot size for marijuana growing operations remained four times (18,113.78 square feet) the 
size of the 2005 average for the City of Surrey. This finding further supported earlier 
predictions by Plecas et al. (2005) suggesting that marijuana producers would gravitate 
toward larger, more remote properties in order to increase production and minimize 
police and community detection. The larger property size associated with marijuana 
growing operations was also not altogether surprising given that to obtain grounds for a 
search warrant the police are limited to conducting a perimeter check from off the 
property when making observations to gather evidence regarding the presence of a 
marijuana growing operation (Hill, 2007). 
 The data were also analyzed to determine the nature of the differences existing 
between the two enforcement models after enforcement action was taken. The first 
characteristic examined was whether any differences existed in the status of complaint 
(see Table 5.7).  
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 Table 5.7 – Comparisons of Characteristics after Enforcement Action by RCMP 
and EFSI Cases 
Characteristic RCMP EFSI 
Status of Complaint 
Founded 
80.9 %* 3.9 % 
Status of Complaint 
Founded but too late 
8.2 %* 65 % 
Property Change 42.4 %* 34.1 % 
Other Drugs Seized 11.7 %* 0 % 
Equipment Seized 74.6 %* 0.6 % 
Guard Dog Present 5.1 %* 1.1 % 
Presence of Hydro Bypass 47.3 %* 0.6 % 
Firearms Seized 2.3 % 0.6 % 
Children Present 11.7 % 9.4 % 
     * c2, p<0.05. 
 
This analysis revealed that, when the RCMP attended a residence, there was a much 
greater likelihood of finding a marijuana growing operation (80.9 percent) compared to 
an EFSI case (4 percent). This was likely a direct result of the EFSI team providing the 
owner a 48-hour notice of inspection. This notice provided individuals the opportunity to 
dismantle the marijuana growing operations, only leaving behind evidence of a past 
growing operation (i.e. improper wiring, empty plant pots, marijuana shake). Given this, 
the figures for the EFSI and RCMP cases from both the Founded and Founded but too 
late groups were combined to determine whether any differences remained between the 
groups. The findings (see Table 5.8) remained significant even after the groups were 
combined indicating that when the RCMP attended the site of a suspected marijuana 
growing operation, the case was more likely to be founded than when EFSI attended.    
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Table 5.8 – Status of Complaint: Percentage for each Status from November 1, 2004 
to November 30, 2006 
   Status of complaint  
  Founded Founded 
but too late 
Unfounded
* 
Other No 
Action 
Total 
Action RCMP 80.9 % 8.2 % 0 % 4.7 % 6.2 % 100 % 
  EFSI 3.9 % 65 % 15 % 10 % 6.1 % 100 % 
* c2, p<0.05. 
 
In terms of changes in property ownership subsequent to RCMP or EFSI action, 
there was also a significant difference. Property owners were more likely to make a 
property change after the RCMP attended a residence than if the EFSI team attended. As 
indicated earlier, the RCMP has a Proceeds of Crime unit that is predominantly dedicated 
to the restraint and forfeiture of houses involved in marijuana production. The potential 
risk of having one’s property seized likely played a role in the greater propensity to 
change ownership in the RCMP group of cases. Furthermore, the legalities associated 
with the criminal justice approach may have also motivated individuals to sell their 
properties in an effort to conceal assets. 
 The remaining characteristics listed in Table 5.7 related to findings within the 
residences once entry was made. The majority of the differences between the RCMP and 
EFSI cases were statistically significant. In cases where the RCMP attended, using the 
traditional enforcement response model, there was a greater likelihood of locating other 
drugs, such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, equipment used to produce 
marijuana, a hydro bypass, or a guard dog within the residence. There was no difference 
in the likelihood of finding a firearm when inspecting a growing operation for either EFSI 
or RCMP, nor was there a difference in the likelihood of locating children (approximately 
10%) within the residence, although, as noted earlier, the reliability of the information 
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regarding the presence of children was questionable as this information was not 
consistently captured in police cases.27 Analyses into the type of seizures made, whether 
or not charges were laid by Crown, and the likelihood of finding suspects were not 
comparable since the EFSI enforcement model is an administrative approach and thereby 
not driven by the criminal justice system.   
Pre-Bylaw Rate of Re-establishment  
There was a greater likelihood of re-establishment for the EFSI group (see Table 
5.9). The greater likelihood was statistically significant and was three times (12.7 per 
cent) higher for EFSI cases than RCMP cases (4.1 per cent). Importantly, this analysis 
considered re-establishment before the Controlled Substance Property Bylaw was in 
effect, thus ensuring that the bylaw did not interfere with the results. 
 
Table 5.9 – Pre-Bylaw Rate of Re-establishment of Marijuana Growing Operations 
Action   Reestablished Total 
  No Yes*  
RCMP Count 141 6 147 
  % 95.9% 4.1% 100.0% 
EFSI Count 110 16 126 
  % 87.3% 12.7% 100.0% 
Total Count 251 22 273 
 % 91.9% 8.1% 100.0% 
* c2, p<0.05. 
 
Under EFSI, the cases appeared to start as larger growing operations. Specifically, the 
average daily consumption was 130 kilowatt-hours per day for EFSI versus 106 kilowatt-
hours per day for RCMP cases, although this difference was not statistically significant 
                                                 
27 For the most part, police files noted whether a child (or children) was present. Typically, however, the 
precise number of children on scene is not provided.  
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(see Table 5.10). As well, growing operations dismantled by EFSI re-started earlier (6.25 
months) compared to RCMP cases (7.5 months). Again, this difference was not 
statistically significant indicating that growing operations dismantled by EFSI were less 
likely to be deterred from re-starting. Further, not only did these cases exhibit a greater 
propensity for re-starts, they consumed higher levels of Hydro power, indicating that the 
operations were larger than RCMP re-starts. 
 
Table 5.10 – Pre-Bylaw Rate of Re-establishment of Marijuana Growing Operations 
by Opportunity and Amount of Consumption 
Action  Opportunity to 
Re-Establish 
(Months) 
Daily Average 
Consumption 
(Kilowatts) 
Re-establishment 
Time 
(Months) 
RCMP Mean 18.37 106.17 7.50 
 N 147 6 6 
EFSI Mean 13.48 129.69 6.25 
 N 120 16 16 
Total Mean 16.17 123.27 6.59 
 N 267 22 22 
 
EFSI cases had a statistically significant lower opportunity to experience a re-start. 
Specifically, EFSI cases had 13 months to re-start versus 18 months in the case of RCMP. 
Despite having less of an opportunity for re-establishment, this group had a significantly 
higher rate of re-establishment. This finding, in addition to the above findings, suggested 
that cultivators were less likely to be deterred when suspected growing operations were 
responded to by EFSI, rather than the RCMP. 
Post-Bylaw Rate of Re-establishment  
As mentioned earlier, one change that took place in Surrey during this research 
project was the introduction of the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw. This bylaw 
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appeared to have a substantial impact on the likelihood of re-starts. This can be seen in 
Table 5.11 which provides data on the likelihood of re-establishment after the bylaw was 
enacted.  
 
 
Table 5.11 Post-Bylaw Rate of Re-establishment of Marijuana Growing Operations 
by RCMP and EFSI Cases 
   Re-established Total 
   No Yes   
RCMP Count 107 1 108 
  %  99.1% .9% 100.0% 
EFSI Count 41 0 41 
  %  100.0% .0% 100.0% 
Total Count 148 1 149 
 %  99.3% .7% 100.0% 
 
 
Specifically, only one RCMP case and none of the EFSI cases resulted in a re-
establishment after the bylaw was enacted. On a cautionary note, however, one must be 
careful when interpreting this result because, as demonstrated in Table 5.12, the RCMP 
cases had only 5.5 months in which to re-start, while EFSI cases had 7.8 months. 
  
Table 5.12 – Post-Bylaw Rate of Re-establishment of Marijuana Growing 
Operations by Opportunity 
Action Opportunity 
(Months) 
N Standard 
Deviation 
RCMP 5.5 109 2.72 
EFSI 7.8 41 1.65 
Total 6.1 150 2.67 
 
 
 
This somewhat limited amount of opportunity was noteworthy because re-starts generally 
occurred within about six months. Accordingly, more time for the opportunity to re-
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establish is necessary to allow for further study and to have more conclusive findings. 
Still, the fact that the re-establishment rate was virtually zero was very encouraging. 
Comparison of Pre-Bylaw and Post-Bylaw Characteristics  
The background characteristics of RCMP and EFSI cases before and after the 
implementation of the bylaw were compared. No major change in housing characteristics 
were noted before or after the bylaw was implemented for EFSI or RCMP cases. The 
only key observation was that an extended period of study was needed to fully understand 
the effect of the bylaw as this would allow for greater opportunity for re-establishment, 
especially where RCMP cases were concerned (See Table 5.13). 
 
Table 5.13 –Pre Bylaw Comparison of Property Characteristics of Marijuana 
Growing Operations by RCMP and EFSI Cases 
Action   Opportunity
(Months) 
BC Lot Size 
(Square 
Footage) 
Assessed 
Land 
 (Lot Value) 
Assessed 
Improvement 
Total 
Taxes 
Time 
elapsed 
(days) 
RCMP Mean 18.37 30,091.09 272,920.71 126,436.43 2,741.96 9.82 
  N 147 139 140 140 140 147 
EFSI Mean 13.48 26,668.07 263,331.45 109,005.65 3,011.63 86.42 
  N 120 123 124 124 124 115 
Total Mean 16.17 28,484.10 268,416.67 118,249.24 2,868.63 43.44 
  N 267 262 264 264 264 262 
 
 
 
Table 5.14 – Post Bylaw Comparison of Property Characteristics of Marijuana 
Growing Operations by RCMP and EFSI Cases 
Action   Opportunity
(Months) 
BC Lot Size 
(Square 
Footage) 
Assessed 
Land 
 (Lot Value)* 
Assessed 
Improvement 
Total 
Taxes 
Time 
elapsed 
(days)* 
RCMP Mean 5.52 12,392.75 219,406.86 110,132.35 2,407.93 12.24 
  N 109 102 102 102 102 107 
EFSI Mean 7.78 16,945.18 246,950.00 102,742.50 2,542.52 71.35 
  N 41 40 40 40 40 40 
Total Mean 6.14 13,675.12 227,165.49 108,050.70 2,445.84 28.33 
  N 150 142 142 142 142 147 
* c2, p<0.05. 
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The only statistically significant difference in property characteristics after the 
implementation of the bylaw was within the assessed land values between the two 
groups. EFSI cases were found to have significantly greater assessed land values 
($246,950.00) compared to RCMP cases ($219,406.86) (see Table 5.14). This difference 
was likely due to the legalities of policing.  
The police have considerable difficulty bringing to justice persons engaged in 
marijuana cultivation in their homes. Under the present constitutional context, a police 
officer cannot walk onto private property to undertake a perimeter search28 of a dwelling 
in order to make observations to gather evidence consistent with a marijuana growing 
operation as the occupant’s reasonable expectation of privacy would be infringed (Hill, 
2007). This restriction has limited police officers to conducting surveillance and 
investigating marijuana growing operations on smaller lot sizes as it simplifies the 
process of gathering evidence. 
 It was hypothesized that of all the RCMP cases of marijuana growing operations, 
the ones where a no case seizure of marijuana took place would be the most similar group 
to EFSI cases. For this reason, an analysis of the re-establishment rate for RCMP cases by 
the type of seizure made was conducted to determine whether any differences existed (see 
Table 5.15). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 A lawful perimeter search is one conducted from off the subject property (Hill, 2007). 
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 Table 5.15 – Rate of Re-establishment for RCMP Cases by Type of Seizure 
Reestablished Type of Seizure 
No Yes 
Total 
Case Count 104 2 106 
 % 98.1 % 1.9 % 100.0 % 
No case Count 145 5 150 
 % 96.7 % 3.3 % 100.0 % 
Total Count 249 7 256 
 % 97.3 % 2.7 % 100.0 % 
 
 
Although re-establishment was slightly higher in the no case seizure group, this finding 
was not statistically significant.  
 Suspecting that those individuals who stayed at a residence once the police or 
EFSI had attended were of particular interest, since they were more likely to establish a 
marijuana growing operation in the first place, the rate of re-establishment within the 
Property did not Change Owner Name group was examined. The results of this analysis 
are presented in Table 5.16. 
 
Table 5.16 – Pre-Bylaw Re-Establishment by Whether or not the Property Changed 
Owner Name after Dismantling of Grow Operation29
 Re-Establishment within 
RCMP Model 
% 
Re-Establishment within 
EFSI Model 
% 
Property Changed Owner 
Name 
1.3 % 2.4 % 
Property did not Change 
Owner Name 
8.1 % 18.1 %* 
* Difference in models c2, p<0.05..  
 
 
                                                 
29 All properties where either an outright change in ownership or a name change took place were considered 
a part of the Property Changed Owner Name group. This information was determined by querying 
Tempest, the City of Surrey database that tracks ownership data.  
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Not surprisingly, locations where no change in owner name took place had a significantly 
greater likelihood, under both the RCMP and EFSI model, to re-establish a growing 
operation. In the case of EFSI, re-establishment was more than double that of the RCMP 
where there was no change in property ownership.  
 
Table 5.17 – Pre-Bylaw Characteristics of Re-Establishment in No Change Group 
by RCMP and EFSI Cases 
Action   Opportunity
(Months) 
Re-establishment 
(Months) 
Average 
Consumption 
(Kilowatts/Day) 
RCMP Mean 17.42 7.75 101.50 
  N 53 4 4 
EFSI Mean 12.76 3.17 131.67 
  N 70 12 15 
Total Mean 14.76 4.31 125.32 
  N 123 16 19 
 
Furthermore, as indicated in Table 5.17, the rate of re-establishment among those 
properties where no change in ownership occurred was more than twice in the case of 
EFSI and used 30% more consumption with five months less time to re-start than RCMP 
cases. Presumably there was less deterrence in cases responded to by EFSI, which was 
consistent with expectations, prior to the introduction of the Controlled Substance 
Property Bylaw.   
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Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
The present research indicated that the rate of re-establishment for marijuana 
growing operations in the case of EFSI was three times (12.7%) greater than cases where 
a traditional enforcement tactic was employed by the police (4.1%). Furthermore, the 
likelihood of re-establishment for EFSI cases increased to one in every five cases in 
residences where no change in property ownership took place. The data also suggested 
that, where EFSI cases were concerned, marijuana growing operations re-established 
faster and on a larger scale, despite having less time to do so.  
The issue of re-establishment was mitigated considerably with the introduction of 
the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw as the rate became virtually zero for both 
RCMP and EFSI cases. It would appear that the bylaw was a necessary compliment to the 
EFSI program in reducing the likelihood of re-establishment. In essence, the bylaw 
seemed to act as a deterrent combined with the actions of the court system in British 
Columbia. It is reasonable to assume that the above findings would hold true in provinces 
with similar sentencing patterns to that of British Columbia. However, whether the bylaw 
would result in an equally effective deterrent in provinces with stricter sentencing 
patterns is questionable.  
In the absence of the Controlled Substance Property Bylaw, a rate of re-
establishment of 12.7% (or 16 cases) over two years for EFSI cases could be viewed as 
insignificant since the number of overall cases was relatively small. However, when the 
impact of the finding is considered across all jurisdictions in Canada, particularly 
provinces such as Quebec and Ontario that have been experiencing increasing rates, the 
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importance of the result is increased. Given this, consideration of the likelihood of re-
establishment across the country is important as there has been an abundance of recent 
evidence indicating that marijuana growing operations are increasingly being detected 
across the country (World Drug Report, 2006). 
Finally, the problem of illicit marijuana production is by no means limited to 
Canada. In fact, in 2006 a total of 82 countries around the world provided the United 
Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) with estimates related to marijuana 
production. Whereas, for the purpose of comparison, only 36 countries provided 
estimates for opium poppy cultivation, and only six provided estimates for coca leaf 
production (World Drug Report, 2006). In terms of the magnitude of global marijuana 
production, recent estimates indicate that approximately 45,000 metric tons was produced 
in 2006, which was more than twice as high as a decade earlier (World Drug Report, 
2006).  
Implications of Bill 25 – Safety Standards Amendment Act  
 Initially, the work of EFSI was predominantly driven by anonymous informant 
information that had become backlogged with the police over time. The reliability of 
informant data, in comparison to other sources, likely impeded the ability of the team to 
locate founded (or more precisely founded but too late) growing operations. Furthermore, 
the original model of EFSI was heavily reliant on the police to provide information to the 
team. There were times over the two year period of interest where the EFSI team was 
placed on hiatus due to a lack of available information to follow-up (L. Garis, personal 
communication March 12, 2007).  
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The introduction of Bill 25 helped alleviate some of the above challenges. 
Presently, the City of Surrey receives information pertaining to high consumption 
locations directly from BC Hydro which is provided to the EFSI team. This modification 
improved the EFSI team by allowing for the inclusion of other risk factors posed by 
locations of interest into the overall equation of public safety, rather than simply 
responding to community complaints in a piecemeal, reactive manner. This is not to say 
that community complaints have been removed from consideration, but this source of 
information is presently cross-referenced with BC Hydro information and assessed within 
the larger context. The likelihood of attending founded (or founded but too late) grow 
operations should be positively influenced by the provisions of Bill 25, thereby, reducing 
associated risks to public safety even further. 
In terms of future policy decisions regarding illicit marijuana cultivation and 
related public safety concerns, information pertaining to consumption data provided a 
level of insight and understanding into the extent of the problem within various 
jurisdictions and, more importantly, within the province that had been otherwise 
unavailable to date. Although consumption data is not a perfect barometer, it does allow 
for the most informed estimates available regarding the amount of marijuana production 
taking place within a jurisdiction. This information enables the development of informed 
policy decisions related to whether or not the levels of enforcement should be further 
expanded and where existing resources should be targeted. 
Limitations of Non-Traditional Enforcement Response 
 The foundation for the EFSI approach was grounded in the prevention of fires 
resulting from the improper wiring commonly found in marijuana growing operations. A 
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residence must consume 93 kilowatt hours per day in order to fall within the mandate of 
the EFSI program. As was demonstrated in Table 4.1, although EFSI dealt with some of 
the community complaints regarding marijuana growing operations, one-third of the 
complaints failed to meet the 93 kilowatt threshold and was returned to the police with no 
action taken. 
 Furthermore, the potential for improper wiring exists in all marijuana growing 
operations, yet the EFSI team was limited to only those locations where an abnormally 
high level of electricity was being consumed. The data from the present research 
indicated that those incidents where a hydro bypass30 was located had a higher likelihood 
of fire than those where a hydro bypass was not located. As Table 5.7 suggested, nearly 
half (47.3%) of all marijuana growing operations responded to by the RCMP involved a 
hydro bypass. In terms of electrical wiring and safety concerns, a considerable risk to 
safety continues to be posed by cases that currently fall outside the mandate of the 
program. 
Benefits of Non-Traditional Enforcement Response 
 The introduction of EFSI alleviated some of the burden on the police by enabling 
a 29% reduction (or 12.5 days) in response time informant information (i.e. Crime 
Stoppers) related to marijuana growing operations. In the preliminary discussion stages of 
EFSI, it was envisioned that the program would allow the police to focus on 
investigations to ensure that charges were increasingly being forwarded and that those 
charges would result in a greater number of criminal convictions. Given the length of 
time it takes for the court system to lay charges, it is too soon to comment on whether this 
                                                 
30 An incident where a Theft of Hydro takes place involves the installation of a jumper cable ahead of the 
meter to effectively by-pass the meter. 
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occurred. However, the number of founded complaints made by the police does indicate 
that some improvement in police effectiveness took place in 2006.  
The findings further demonstrated that marijuana growing operations tended to be 
located on properties that were five times the average lot size. It was assumed this was 
the result of deliberate efforts to avoid detection on the part of marijuana cultivators. 
What was more disturbing was that properties that received either “No Action” or were 
“EFSI return to RCMP” cases were situated on the largest lot sizes and had the highest 
assessed improvement value.31 This suggested that a system needs to be put in place to 
deal with larger properties where no theft of hydro power takes place, but the property 
poses a challenge for police surveillance. 
The findings from the present research on the types of seizures, suspects, and 
charges, all indicated a significant difference between EFSI and the police – which will 
always be the case given that the ultimate goal of the EFSI program is to ensure electrical 
safety, rather than to arrest and prosecute offenders. Earlier cost comparisons between the 
EFSI and the police approach indicated that the EFSI process was more cost effective 
than the traditional enforcement response (Garis, 2005). Although the existence of the 
EFSI initiative has resulted in lower police costs in the long-term, a direct cost 
comparison between the two approaches is not realistic as it would fail to acknowledge 
the complexities and challenges facing a public police force.  
The EFSI approach was established to strictly contend with high consumption 
residences, whereas the police must continue to maintain the expertise and resources 
required to respond to all of the various types of marijuana production, including high 
                                                 
31 Improvements, for assessment purposes, generally refer to any building, fixture, or structure placed on 
land or water (BC Property Assessment Appeal Board, 2007)  
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consumption, theft of hydro, and hybrid thefts in addition to suspects, investigations, 
court; all of which takes place in police cases where a marijuana growing operation is 
discovered during the commission of another crime. In effect, the traditional enforcement 
response and the non-traditional enforcement response are independent and service 
unique needs; therefore, cannot be directly compared in terms of costs. Furthermore, 
given the unique needs serviced by both models, it would not be implausible to state that 
one model should not exist without the other as only a multi-faceted approach, involving 
a multitude of stakeholders within the community, can address the complex problem of 
marijuana growing operations and related public safety concerns. 
Based on an analysis of the data collected for this current study, the EFSI program 
does appear to be an ideal example of the benefits of increasing public involvement in 
reducing crime and of integrating stakeholders responsible for improving public safety. 
Surrey has made every effort to ensure the approach has all the necessary components to 
maintain safer and healthier communities in the long-term.  
Future Direction of Marijuana Enforcement 
The future direction of marijuana enforcement is dependent on the continued 
involvement of additional stakeholders. Despite the existence of a number of local 
initiatives responding to the proliferation of marijuana growing operations, the problem 
has continued to present a significant hazard to public safety in the absence of integrated 
efforts aimed at response and prevention. 
The realization that electrical power is the backbone of the cultivation process is 
increasingly becoming the focal point for future strategies targeting marijuana 
production. Key stakeholders, such as BC Hydro, have been instrumental in moving 
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toward a more integrated, “smarter solution” to marijuana enforcement. The first 
advancement in this regard derived from the added benefit of the amendment to the 
Safety Standards Act (in the form of Bill 25) allowing jurisdictions to receive information 
on residences consuming higher than normal amounts of electricity. The second 
advancement, which is still pending, is the implementation of digital meters on residences 
to increase energy conservation efforts (Bermingham, 2007). These meters are expected 
to be in place by 2010 or 2011. The digital meters will enable real-time detection of 
occurrences of theft of hydro power making it increasingly risky for individuals to 
attempt to steal electricity. These changes will assist in ensuring that marijuana producers 
in all jurisdictions are detected in the first instance simply through the examination of 
consumption records or digital meter readings, rather than a reliance on community 
complaints or the surveillance efforts of the police. 
The whole issue of consumption of electricity has opened the door for further 
examination of the apparatus required in the production of marijuana, namely hydroponic 
equipment. This recognition has led to strategies seeking the establishment of regulatory 
options aimed at ensuring hydroponic equipment is restricted to legitimate users. This 
will allow for yet another integrated, broad-based strategy to attack the problem at its 
source, rather than attempting to manage its expansion, as has commonly been the case.  
Directions for Further Research 
 The results of the present research indicated that the rate of re-establishment of 
marijuana growing operations was virtually non-existent in both the case of EFSI and the 
police once the Controlled Substances Property Bylaw was in place. However, in order to 
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gain additional confidence in these findings, it is recommended that the study continue 
for an additional six months to allow for sufficient time for re-establishment to take place.  
Furthermore, this study speculated on the potential reasons behind the finding that 
re-establishment took place at both a greater and faster rate in EFSI and police cases 
where properties did not experience a change in ownership. This occurrence, however, 
necessitates further consideration to obtain a better understanding of the relationship 
between ownership and re-establishment of marijuana growing operations. This would 
assist in the development of more informed policies and practices to future growing 
operations. With the present knowledge, enforcement efforts related to residences 
dismantled or rendered “safe” by either the police or EFSI could be streamlined by 
conducting a simple audit of the consumption levels of residences where a change in 
ownership had not taken place. Further research on this topic would also allow for greater 
sophistication in the deployment of enforcement resources when targeting repeat 
locations.  
 The notion of lot size and marijuana growing operations was a recurring theme in 
the present research. It has become increasingly apparent that, in the absence of a 
coordinated strategy to address growing operations, cultivators will continue to evade 
detection by purchasing residences situated on larger lots and hiding their operations with 
the presence of natural barriers, or simply by relocating to rural areas. From a public 
safety point of view, the displacement of such cultivation sites is not a desirable solution 
as the threats posed by such sites continue unabated for the most part. Identification of 
the characteristics of marijuana cultivation sites would serve to better inform the various 
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stakeholders, namely members of the community, in turn allowing for improved 
coordination of enforcement efforts within the provinces. 
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Appendix A 
 
INCIDENT FORM 
 
 
Part 1 
1  ID# (use assigned numbers) 
2  Incident ID# 
3  File Year (2004, 2005, 0r 2006) 
4  File Number 
5  District (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) 
6  Street Number 
7  Street Name 
8 - Date Offence Reported (dd-mm-yy) 
9 
 
 
- Date Offence Attended (dd-mm-yy) 
10  Time Elapsed (days between offence report and attendance) 
11  Source of Complaint 
12  Status of Complaint (0=unfounded, 1=founded, 2=no action, 
3=other, 4=founded but too late) 
13  Type of Facility 
14  Rented (1=rented, 2=owned, 3=Crown, 4=other, 5=don’t 
know) 
15  Action (1=no action, 2=RCMP, 3=EFSI, 4=EFSI return 
RCMP) 
Part 2 
16  Number of Marijuana Plants Seized 
17  Number of kg of Marijuana Seized 
18  Other Drugs Seized (0=none, 1=cocaine, 2=heroin, 3=other) 
19  Firearm Seized (0=none, 1=prohibited, 2=restricted, 3=other, 
4=mix) 
20  Other Weapons Seized (1=yes, 0=no) 
21  Equipment Seized (1=yes, 0=no) 
22  Number of Lights Seized 
23  Amount of Cash Seized (Nearest C$, 1US$=1.2C$) 
24  Number of Children Present 
25  Fire Involved (1=yes, 0=no, DK=3) 
26  Other Hazards Present (1=booby trap, 2=explosive, 3=toxin, 
4=other, 5=mix) 
27  Guard Dog Present (1=yes, 0=no, 3=DK) 
28  Presence of Hydro By-Pass (1=yes, 0=no) 
29  Amount of Theft in Hydro (In Cdn$ to nearest dollar) 
 
1=h
2=a
3=w
4=d
bar
5=o
6=o
7=v
8=o
 
100
28 g
450
 
1=c  
2=r
3=s
4=la
5=o
6=g
7=B
8=o
9=m
10=
11=
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  Source of Complaint 
rime stoppers/informant
outine check 
erving a warrant 
ndlord 
ther crime 
eneral investigation 
C Hydro 
ther 
issing 
neighbour 
traffic violation/incident ou
pa  
ar
et
n 
ut
ut
eh
th
0 g
m
gmType of Facility 
se 
rtment/multiple units
ehouse/commercial 
ached bldg e.g. shed, 
doors – Private 
doors – Crown land 
icle 
er  
m
=1
=Conversion
=1 kg 
 oz 
1 lb
30  Use of Violence at Time of Arrest (1=yes, 0=no) 
31  Type of Seizure (1=case, 2=no case) 
32  Date of Report to the Crown (dd-mm-yy) 
33  Charges laid by Crown (1=yes, 0=no) 
34  Number of Suspects 
35  Suspects Present (1=yes, 0=no) 
Part 3 
36 - Date of Drive-By (dd-mm-yy) 
37  Status of Drive-By (0=unfounded, FOI not sent no further 
action, 1=founded, FOI sent)  
38  Status of FOI (0=no comment, 1=high cons) 
39  Evidence of grow op (1=yes, 0=no) 
40  Disconnected due to non-compliance order (1=yes, 0=no) 
41 - Date Disconnected (dd-mm-yy) 
42  Time Elapsed (days between attended and disconnect) 
43  7 Day Repair Notice Issued (1=yes, 2=no) 
44 - Electrical Permit Issued (dd-mm-yy) 
45 - Hydro Reconnected (dd-mm-yy) 
46  Time Elapsed (days between disconnect to reconnect) 
47  Bylaw Enacted by EFSI (1=yes, 2=no) 
Part 4 
48  BC Lot Size (sq ft) 
49  Assessed Land Value for 2005 (In Cdn$) 
50  Assessed Improvements for 2005 (In Cdn$) 
51  Net Taxes Paid in 2005 (In Cdn$) 
52 - Purchase Date (dd-mm-yy) 
53 - Property Change Date (dd-mm-yy) 
54  Property Change (1=no change, 2= Sold to New Owner,  
3= Name Change but Same Owner) 
55  Time Elapsed (days between purchase to property change) 
56  Time Elapsed (days between date attended to property change) 
Part 5 
57  Re-established (1=yes, 2=no) 
58  Daily Average Consumption (kilowatt) 
59 - Date Re-established (dd-mm-yy) 
60  Time Elapsed (months between date attended to re-
establishment) 
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